If inequality in the UK has been rising, in Poland it has been falling. Unemployment in Poland has dropped (by the Eurostat measure of economically inactive) from 18.9% in May 2004, the highest in the EU, to 3.2% in November 2019, the third-lowest in the EU. Wage rates have been rising faster than inflation (chart below shows that average wages in the Polish private sector have grown by 207% since 2004, while consumer prices have risen by 139%). Things are getting, on average, better.
Inequality, as expressed by the Gini coefficient, has fallen. In 2018, Poland had the ninth-lowest inequality of income in the EU at 0.278 (on the scale where 0 = perfect equality and 1 = one person has it all). In 2011, Poland was in 17th place in the EU, with a Gini coefficient of 0.311. Meanwhile, in the UK, inequality has been rising over this same period, slipping from 21st place in 2011, at 0.330, to 24th place at 0.342 in 2018.
Communism gave Poland uravnilovka - the concept of making society equal by levelling down. An intense class war was waged by the Soviet communist proxies running Poland in Stalinist years to rid the country of the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia from positions of power within the state. An entire ministry where the only person with a degree was the janitor. If your hands weren't calloused by years of physical labour you were deemed a class enemy and held back from promotion. The result was a society in which tram drivers and university lecturers lived cheek-by-jowl in the same overcrowded tenements, and czy się stoi czy się leży, dwa tysiące się należy - pretty much near-equality of pay across the economy.
Things changed on 1 January 1990. The Balcerowicz plan came into effect - total, sudden, deregulation. Currency exchange controls, import controls, restrictions on setting up businesses - swept away. You could get in a train, go to West Berlin, buy bananas and sell them on a Warsaw street corner for the equivalent of a week's wages per kilo. Entrepreneurial Poles - of whom there were many - found niches and built good businesses very quickly. Drive to Vienna, buy a van-load of aquarium fish-food and corner that market. Less-driven Poles, of whom there were also many, complained that state-sponsored arts were being cut or that the Jews were taking over. Within a few years, the blocks of flats where professors neighboured tram drivers suddenly had guarded car parks with new Audis standing next to battered Fiat 126Ps. Those with the crap cars found it easier to say that the owners of the new cars had made their money by theft or corruption than by admitting that their neighbours worked 12-hour days running shops or warehouses or transport businesses while they watched Brazilian soap operas.
Poland is still on the receiving end of the benefits of globalisation. Jobs of ever-increasing sophistication are moved here from Western Europe and the US. Having been here for 22 years, I have observed the process accelerating; once it was basic handsarbeit, moved east from Germany for cost reasons.
We used to see the relocation of poorly-paid work to Poland. That's while the country was in the throes of the first wave of globalisation. Today we're seeing the relocation of better-paid work to Poland.
Many years ago, I visited a medium-sized factory in western Poland that made hinges for a large Germany manufacturer of doors and windows, its only customer. Around 70 workers in three buildings, bending strips of metal and drilling holes in them. Dwarfing the buildings was an enormous warehouse used to store raw materials and finished pieces. Much cheaper than keeping stock in Germany.
These days, the manufacturers I visit across Poland make bits that go into aircraft engines; high technology work with advanced materials, where many on the shop floor hold Master's degrees in engineering. Delivery of raw materials and collection of finished pieces is done just-in-time; the latest managerial techniques are in use to ensure continual improvement, quality and work-flow management. More and more robots are in evidence, connected to one another in an intelligent network.
Poland finds itself increasingly integrated into global supply chains. EU-funded infrastructure projects have improved transport links within the country greatly (as this blog testifies). Labour costs are no longer seven times lower than in the UK, as they were when I moved here, but around half (and one-third those in London). That's still a big enough difference to make relocation to Poland worthwhile.
Banks are setting up sophisticated quantitative analytics centres in Poland; large corporates are moving financial and IT hubs to Poland from which they service their European, EMEA or global networks. Engineering firms and architectural practices are shifting project work here; they do little work for Poland, but their Polish-based design bureaus work on projects in the Middle East, Africa or beyond.
This squares with Douglas McWilliams' forecast that for some time to come, the biggest hit to their earnings will be taken by those in the West who are neither poor nor rich, those between the 35th and 70th centile in the income distribution curve. More of their jobs will move to countries to Poland for some while yet, until convergence with the West has risen to the point where locational arbitrage makes no further sense.
If globalisation has made the poorer British citizens poorer, it has made most Poles better off, and it has - so far - had a positive effect on the economy and society.
A factor that should not be ignored in the story of falling Polish inequality is the introduction of EU agricultural transfers post 2004, which have helped reduce the income gap between urban and rural Poland.
Poles tend to be more careful with their money. Their history has seen successive invasions, partitions, uprisings - one generation's wealth has often been wiped out by wars - or, in the case of 1989 and 1990 - inflation, reaching 800%. And then the whole process of wealth creation begins again, with a new generation. I'd argue that this is why many see the purchase of real estate as a hedge against turmoil - you own the house, the land, it's registered in the 'eternal book' (księga wieczysta, as the land and mortgage register is called). After 1990, many of the children whose properties were seized by communist governments successfully claimed them back. But cash savings were devoured by inflation.
A final summing up of this series here.
This time four years ago:
Work on rail modernisation, Jeziorki
This time six years ago:
In which I get started on Twitter
This time seven years ago:
London Underground is 150 years old
This time eight years ago:
My enemy's enemy is my...?
This time nine years ago:
Some thoughts upon the Nature of Warfare
This time ten years ago:
Snow so deep it needs a plough
This time 11 years ago:
A fieldfare in midwinter
Friday, 10 January 2020
Thursday, 9 January 2020
The Inequality Paradox Part IV
If Part III of the book was the most entertaining, Part IV is really where it's at - the policy responses to inequality.
The first chapter is a bit of futurology - what is likely to happen. McWilliams explains that we are likely to see the very richest - in particular those who own technology - become even richer than the rest of society. Robots that build robots, AI that writes computer programmes, scaled up network effects that create supereconomies of scale, will benefit above all those who own them.
It will be those of middle incomes, not the poorest, who will suffer most. The poor will continue to advance out of poverty, though at a slow rate. McWilliams forecasts (and he is an accomplished economic forecaster) that those between 35th and 70th centile of wealth distribution will see their incomes drop by up to 5% a year every year to 2040 in relation to a 2018 base. The poorest quarter of society will see their incomes rise by 2%-3% a year, while the richest 5% will see their incomes rise by 10%-12% a year to 2040. This forecast assumes a slow rise in inequality. But if, in another scenario, inequality rises at a faster rate, the richest will see incomes rising by 20%-25% a year (every year to 2040), the middle earners' incomes will shrink by up to 15% a year - but for the poorest, only the slightest improvement to their lot.
Not a happy picture then - inequality is destined to grow, and with it the attendant social and political problems. So - what are the correct policy responses?
Firstly - education. Education with a focus on primary and secondary - designed to empower children but also to support social cohesion. Education systems that create elites only serve to entrench those elites' sense of entitlement. What's needed from an education system that is inequality-proofed? According to McWilliams, it should "encourage people's inner resources to enable them to run their lives. These inner resources can include: curiosity; long-term memory; imagination... the ability to understand the world and other people and extract deeper meaning through metaphor - pattern matching; an observing self,the ability to empathise and connect with others; a rational mind both for its own sake and to cross-check emotional reactions." Having put both my children through the Polish school system (in the global Top Ten according to PISA), I would add that a stern dose of rote-learning would come in handy too.
The second target is capitalism. It is good, but it does need regulation. "Capitalism cannot operate in any real sense without strong governmental institutions... Without strong enforcement of property rights, accumulation of capital will not take place because the capitalist is has no incentive to accumulate them if there is no legal title to what he owns... A healthy capitalist sector and a healthy government sector go hand in hand." McWilliams makes a strong case for improved ethics among business owners and managers. "Every person running a business needs to see himself or herself as an ambassador for the system that helps them flourish and therefore needs to behave accordingly."
An aggressive approach to those who abuse capitalism is called for. Travel sanctions and asset freezes. And I would add, rigorous enforcement of Unexplained Wealth Orders, recently introduced in the UK, but as yet not put into everyday use.
The Law of Unintended Consequences, a third target, is a cracker. Whenever legislators intervene, regulate, ban or impose, even with the most benign of motives, some often completely unexpected side-effect crops up. The main ones that McWilliams explores are those that affect the cost of housing - rent controls and planning restrictions. He shows by case studies from Sweden and London just how poorly though through legislation can stoke inequality across the decades. Interventions, he says, should not be made "without thinking through the likely market effects on behaviour".
[I shall return in the next-post-but-one to the word 'behaviour', for I feel that understanding how people respond to changing economic, social and political stimuli]
The fourth policy answer is to make poor people richer by cutting the cost of living, in particular the costs of basics - food, clothing, housing, transport - and a new basic - information (mobile phone, laptop, internet access). "Cutting the costs of mobile telephony benefits the poor three times as it benefits the rich."
A fifth response is to introduce a universal basic income (UBI). If you've not come across this concept before, it's worth having a quick look at this Wikipedia article. UBI will be talked about more and more often in future. It is in essence "czy się stoi, czy się leży, dwa tysiące się należy" ("Whether you're standing [ie working] or lying down, you are entitled to 2,000 zlotys", a popular slogan critical of the Polish communist system). Everyone gets UBI, working or not. UBI is being tested at the moment on a micro scale. Several countries have toyed with the idea. UBI will come into its own when technology-driven mass redundancies start to kick in. Then, as Bill Gates suggested a few years ago, robots should start paying taxes - to fund a UBI.
The obvious response to inequality is to use taxation for redistribution. So many questions immediately spring to mind. "The trick with taxation is not to be greedy and to encourage compliance. It is important that the tax is seen to be legitimate and well-spent (i.e. not on the ruling party's propaganda, as in Poland) and the methods used by the fiscal authorities are not such as to encourage a dangerously adversarial attitude. It is also important that money used by the public sector is not obviously wasted or abused for political purposes." McWilliams suggests that an optimal top-rate income tax would be between 35% and 40%; anything above that is a disincentive to wealth-creation and prompts high earners to seek ways around it; anything lower and the government's tax-take goes down while wealth accumulates and inequality rises. Taxing wealth rather than income is seen by McWilliams as a better way of dealing with inequality.
The final chapter blasts away at false answers, as portrayed by Corbyn on one side of the political spectrum and Trump on the other. Populist solutions, be they anti-capitalism (nationalisation, punitive tax rates, increased regulations) or nativist (tariff walls, anti-migration, deregulation and tax cuts for the rich) are not the answer.
In conclusion, this book avoids dogmatic answers. The suggestions for limiting the harmful effects of inequality are pragmatic, and evidence-based. "The problems are essentially economic, not a Marxist conspiracy theory of the rich exploiting the poor... inequality and poverty don't automatically go together and it is important to avoid policies that might reduce inequality but worsen poverty."
This book is too important to just pass over in a review in one blog post. Having presented the book's key arguments, I shall respond with my own thoughts, jotted in pencil in the margins, in the next-post-but-one, but first a quick look at inequality in the context of Poland.
This time last year:
A Royal Visit to Warsaw
This time two years ago:
Transport news
This time three days ago:
Uneasy Sunny Day - smog
This time four years ago:
Public media? State media? Party media?
[yet another year of not watching a single second of TVP1]
This time five years ago:
Beer, consumer choice and the Meaning of Life
This time six years ago:
What's Cameron got against us Poles?
The time eight years ago:
Anyone still remember the Przybyl case?
This time nine years ago:
Wetlands midwinter meltdown
This time ten years ago:
Jeziorki rail scenes, winter
This time 11 years ago:
Winter drivetime, Jeziorki
This time 12 years ago:
Kraków, a bit of winter sunshine
The first chapter is a bit of futurology - what is likely to happen. McWilliams explains that we are likely to see the very richest - in particular those who own technology - become even richer than the rest of society. Robots that build robots, AI that writes computer programmes, scaled up network effects that create supereconomies of scale, will benefit above all those who own them.
It will be those of middle incomes, not the poorest, who will suffer most. The poor will continue to advance out of poverty, though at a slow rate. McWilliams forecasts (and he is an accomplished economic forecaster) that those between 35th and 70th centile of wealth distribution will see their incomes drop by up to 5% a year every year to 2040 in relation to a 2018 base. The poorest quarter of society will see their incomes rise by 2%-3% a year, while the richest 5% will see their incomes rise by 10%-12% a year to 2040. This forecast assumes a slow rise in inequality. But if, in another scenario, inequality rises at a faster rate, the richest will see incomes rising by 20%-25% a year (every year to 2040), the middle earners' incomes will shrink by up to 15% a year - but for the poorest, only the slightest improvement to their lot.
Not a happy picture then - inequality is destined to grow, and with it the attendant social and political problems. So - what are the correct policy responses?
Firstly - education. Education with a focus on primary and secondary - designed to empower children but also to support social cohesion. Education systems that create elites only serve to entrench those elites' sense of entitlement. What's needed from an education system that is inequality-proofed? According to McWilliams, it should "encourage people's inner resources to enable them to run their lives. These inner resources can include: curiosity; long-term memory; imagination... the ability to understand the world and other people and extract deeper meaning through metaphor - pattern matching; an observing self,the ability to empathise and connect with others; a rational mind both for its own sake and to cross-check emotional reactions." Having put both my children through the Polish school system (in the global Top Ten according to PISA), I would add that a stern dose of rote-learning would come in handy too.
The second target is capitalism. It is good, but it does need regulation. "Capitalism cannot operate in any real sense without strong governmental institutions... Without strong enforcement of property rights, accumulation of capital will not take place because the capitalist is has no incentive to accumulate them if there is no legal title to what he owns... A healthy capitalist sector and a healthy government sector go hand in hand." McWilliams makes a strong case for improved ethics among business owners and managers. "Every person running a business needs to see himself or herself as an ambassador for the system that helps them flourish and therefore needs to behave accordingly."
An aggressive approach to those who abuse capitalism is called for. Travel sanctions and asset freezes. And I would add, rigorous enforcement of Unexplained Wealth Orders, recently introduced in the UK, but as yet not put into everyday use.
The Law of Unintended Consequences, a third target, is a cracker. Whenever legislators intervene, regulate, ban or impose, even with the most benign of motives, some often completely unexpected side-effect crops up. The main ones that McWilliams explores are those that affect the cost of housing - rent controls and planning restrictions. He shows by case studies from Sweden and London just how poorly though through legislation can stoke inequality across the decades. Interventions, he says, should not be made "without thinking through the likely market effects on behaviour".
[I shall return in the next-post-but-one to the word 'behaviour', for I feel that understanding how people respond to changing economic, social and political stimuli]
The fourth policy answer is to make poor people richer by cutting the cost of living, in particular the costs of basics - food, clothing, housing, transport - and a new basic - information (mobile phone, laptop, internet access). "Cutting the costs of mobile telephony benefits the poor three times as it benefits the rich."
A fifth response is to introduce a universal basic income (UBI). If you've not come across this concept before, it's worth having a quick look at this Wikipedia article. UBI will be talked about more and more often in future. It is in essence "czy się stoi, czy się leży, dwa tysiące się należy" ("Whether you're standing [ie working] or lying down, you are entitled to 2,000 zlotys", a popular slogan critical of the Polish communist system). Everyone gets UBI, working or not. UBI is being tested at the moment on a micro scale. Several countries have toyed with the idea. UBI will come into its own when technology-driven mass redundancies start to kick in. Then, as Bill Gates suggested a few years ago, robots should start paying taxes - to fund a UBI.
The obvious response to inequality is to use taxation for redistribution. So many questions immediately spring to mind. "The trick with taxation is not to be greedy and to encourage compliance. It is important that the tax is seen to be legitimate and well-spent (i.e. not on the ruling party's propaganda, as in Poland) and the methods used by the fiscal authorities are not such as to encourage a dangerously adversarial attitude. It is also important that money used by the public sector is not obviously wasted or abused for political purposes." McWilliams suggests that an optimal top-rate income tax would be between 35% and 40%; anything above that is a disincentive to wealth-creation and prompts high earners to seek ways around it; anything lower and the government's tax-take goes down while wealth accumulates and inequality rises. Taxing wealth rather than income is seen by McWilliams as a better way of dealing with inequality.
The final chapter blasts away at false answers, as portrayed by Corbyn on one side of the political spectrum and Trump on the other. Populist solutions, be they anti-capitalism (nationalisation, punitive tax rates, increased regulations) or nativist (tariff walls, anti-migration, deregulation and tax cuts for the rich) are not the answer.
In conclusion, this book avoids dogmatic answers. The suggestions for limiting the harmful effects of inequality are pragmatic, and evidence-based. "The problems are essentially economic, not a Marxist conspiracy theory of the rich exploiting the poor... inequality and poverty don't automatically go together and it is important to avoid policies that might reduce inequality but worsen poverty."
This book is too important to just pass over in a review in one blog post. Having presented the book's key arguments, I shall respond with my own thoughts, jotted in pencil in the margins, in the next-post-but-one, but first a quick look at inequality in the context of Poland.
This time last year:
A Royal Visit to Warsaw
This time two years ago:
Transport news
This time three days ago:
Uneasy Sunny Day - smog
This time four years ago:
Public media? State media? Party media?
[yet another year of not watching a single second of TVP1]
This time five years ago:
Beer, consumer choice and the Meaning of Life
This time six years ago:
What's Cameron got against us Poles?
The time eight years ago:
Anyone still remember the Przybyl case?
This time nine years ago:
Wetlands midwinter meltdown
This time ten years ago:
Jeziorki rail scenes, winter
This time 11 years ago:
Winter drivetime, Jeziorki
This time 12 years ago:
Kraków, a bit of winter sunshine
Wednesday, 8 January 2020
The Inequality Paradox Part III
While I was reading the first chapter of the third part on the Piccadilly line, a young man was craning his neck, reading it over my shoulder. After a while, he could no longer restrain himself and asked what I was reading. I showed him. His girlfriend got out her phone and asked me to show the cover so she could photograph it and buy the book later.
The opening of the third part considers the ultra-rich. What defines them - where they live (London is the world's number one location for people worth $30m or more, with 22,300), where they got their money from, what they spend it on.
This is the most entertaining part of the book - but then everyone enjoys peering into the lives (and in this case the spending) of the rich. Everyone has an opinion about rich people, and in The Inequality Paradox, Douglas McWilliams distinguishes the 'deserving rich' from the 'undeserving rich'. The former contribute to society, by setting up businesses, employing people and creating wealth. At the top of the pyramid of the deserving rich are those who create whole new industries - Bill Gates or Steve Jobs, for example, whose work has changed the way we live.
The undeserving rich are a broader cast ranging from the outright parasitical, born into wealth who merely run down the fortunes bestowed upon them by previous generations, to those who destroy value in society (protection rackets being the most egregious example). Bankers and their bonuses, CEOs who award themselves massive pay rises, rent-seekers who extract more money out of the system, while impoverishing it as a result. Russian privatisation is held up as a good example of how to create the wrong sort of wealthy. Finally politicians who steal money from their country.
Capturing and milking a state is the root cause of inequality in some countries, in others its remuneration committees who insist that their CEO be paid 'in the top quartile' and bankers awarding themselves bonuses so big that they effect entire regional economies. Bankers are of variable value to the societies they serve. Yes, they direct resources to entrepreneurs needing money for growth. But other bits of the financial system are "an enormous casino". This shocked me - did you know that the amount of money traded on Forex markets each day in 2016 was "almost exactly 100 times larger than world cross-border trade." The latter adds value to society - people trading food, furniture, clothes, tools, machines, utensils. The former - foreign currency dealers making money on a tiny spread on huge volumes of money by betting on which direction it's likely to go - adds no real value.
'Clogs to clogs in three generations', a Lancashire saying which suggests that wealth does not survive long in a family, is put to the test based on data. It turns out that it's not three generations - but five, on average. There is churn; there is a lack of drive and need in following generations to replicate the success of the original wealth-creator. But there's one extremely interesting longitudinal study carried out, looking at families from Florence from 1427 to 2011. If your ancestors found themselves in the top 10% of income-tax payers back in the 15th century, your were likely to be earning 5% more in 2011 than people whose ancestors were among the bottom 10% when it came to taxable income.
Wow! It's there - a slight but statistically significant link. A genetic component? Intelligence is hereditary - maybe drive is too?
But it also matters where you are. Italy has been a very static, homogeneous society over the centuries. Another survey conducted by the St Louis Federal Reserve suggested that in the US, it tales just 125 years (five generations) rather than the 700 years in Florence, "for the influence of your ancestry on your income to diminish to less than 5%."
The locational aspect of inequality often comes down to property prices. Carrying out a similar analysis of wealth in the UK shows "an extraordinary concentration of wealth on property". McWilliams adds" one of the causes of inequality in many countries is high and rising property values driven by tight planning regulations." In some respects, Poland is more like the Great Plains than South-East England. Over my 22 years in Warsaw, I've seen the city sprawling far out into new exurbs reachable only by car, ever further from the city centre, with no green belt to halt expansion.
McWilliams returns to the theme of 'superbabies', the result of homogamy, one of the four types of inequality. Homogamy has always been practised within aristocracies, dynastic arranged marriages ensuring the continuity and expansion of nobility and its wealth. The opening up of universities to women, then broadening access to tertiary education, has increased homogamy massively. When I was at university in the late 1970s, only 4% of British school leavers went on to study at one, another 4% going on to polytechnic, seen as an inferior form of tertiary education. Today in the UK and in Poland, it's approaching 50%. On this basis, I would predict that there will be more 'superbabies' in future, better nourished and nurtured than the kids of those without tertiary education. But will this result in more, or less inequality? I believe that part of the 'bubble' effect that social media exacerbates is the fact that those with and those without tertiary education tend to stick to their own.
And at this point it's time (in the next post) to look at the most important part of the book - fixing the problem of inequality - finding the correct policy response.
This time four years ago:
Globalisation and its part in PiS's return to power
This time five years ago:
UK overtakes France as the world's fifth-largest economy
This time nine years ago:
Wetlands winter meltdown
This time ten years ago:
Winter's walk to work
This time 11 years ago:
Winter drivetime, Jeziorki North
The opening of the third part considers the ultra-rich. What defines them - where they live (London is the world's number one location for people worth $30m or more, with 22,300), where they got their money from, what they spend it on.
This is the most entertaining part of the book - but then everyone enjoys peering into the lives (and in this case the spending) of the rich. Everyone has an opinion about rich people, and in The Inequality Paradox, Douglas McWilliams distinguishes the 'deserving rich' from the 'undeserving rich'. The former contribute to society, by setting up businesses, employing people and creating wealth. At the top of the pyramid of the deserving rich are those who create whole new industries - Bill Gates or Steve Jobs, for example, whose work has changed the way we live.
The undeserving rich are a broader cast ranging from the outright parasitical, born into wealth who merely run down the fortunes bestowed upon them by previous generations, to those who destroy value in society (protection rackets being the most egregious example). Bankers and their bonuses, CEOs who award themselves massive pay rises, rent-seekers who extract more money out of the system, while impoverishing it as a result. Russian privatisation is held up as a good example of how to create the wrong sort of wealthy. Finally politicians who steal money from their country.
Capturing and milking a state is the root cause of inequality in some countries, in others its remuneration committees who insist that their CEO be paid 'in the top quartile' and bankers awarding themselves bonuses so big that they effect entire regional economies. Bankers are of variable value to the societies they serve. Yes, they direct resources to entrepreneurs needing money for growth. But other bits of the financial system are "an enormous casino". This shocked me - did you know that the amount of money traded on Forex markets each day in 2016 was "almost exactly 100 times larger than world cross-border trade." The latter adds value to society - people trading food, furniture, clothes, tools, machines, utensils. The former - foreign currency dealers making money on a tiny spread on huge volumes of money by betting on which direction it's likely to go - adds no real value.
'Clogs to clogs in three generations', a Lancashire saying which suggests that wealth does not survive long in a family, is put to the test based on data. It turns out that it's not three generations - but five, on average. There is churn; there is a lack of drive and need in following generations to replicate the success of the original wealth-creator. But there's one extremely interesting longitudinal study carried out, looking at families from Florence from 1427 to 2011. If your ancestors found themselves in the top 10% of income-tax payers back in the 15th century, your were likely to be earning 5% more in 2011 than people whose ancestors were among the bottom 10% when it came to taxable income.
Wow! It's there - a slight but statistically significant link. A genetic component? Intelligence is hereditary - maybe drive is too?
But it also matters where you are. Italy has been a very static, homogeneous society over the centuries. Another survey conducted by the St Louis Federal Reserve suggested that in the US, it tales just 125 years (five generations) rather than the 700 years in Florence, "for the influence of your ancestry on your income to diminish to less than 5%."
The locational aspect of inequality often comes down to property prices. Carrying out a similar analysis of wealth in the UK shows "an extraordinary concentration of wealth on property". McWilliams adds" one of the causes of inequality in many countries is high and rising property values driven by tight planning regulations." In some respects, Poland is more like the Great Plains than South-East England. Over my 22 years in Warsaw, I've seen the city sprawling far out into new exurbs reachable only by car, ever further from the city centre, with no green belt to halt expansion.
McWilliams returns to the theme of 'superbabies', the result of homogamy, one of the four types of inequality. Homogamy has always been practised within aristocracies, dynastic arranged marriages ensuring the continuity and expansion of nobility and its wealth. The opening up of universities to women, then broadening access to tertiary education, has increased homogamy massively. When I was at university in the late 1970s, only 4% of British school leavers went on to study at one, another 4% going on to polytechnic, seen as an inferior form of tertiary education. Today in the UK and in Poland, it's approaching 50%. On this basis, I would predict that there will be more 'superbabies' in future, better nourished and nurtured than the kids of those without tertiary education. But will this result in more, or less inequality? I believe that part of the 'bubble' effect that social media exacerbates is the fact that those with and those without tertiary education tend to stick to their own.
And at this point it's time (in the next post) to look at the most important part of the book - fixing the problem of inequality - finding the correct policy response.
This time four years ago:
Globalisation and its part in PiS's return to power
This time five years ago:
UK overtakes France as the world's fifth-largest economy
This time nine years ago:
Wetlands winter meltdown
This time ten years ago:
Winter's walk to work
This time 11 years ago:
Winter drivetime, Jeziorki North
Monday, 6 January 2020
The Inequality Paradox - Part II
Define 'inequality'. We all think we can define it when we see it - the guy in the black SUV roaring past a rough sleeper huddled a shop doorway; the private jet taxiing to the VIP terminal as the rest of us wait to board our low-cost flight, the family at the gated mansion at the top of the road; the family in the tumble-down cottage at the other end, damp walls, rubbish in the garden...
But these are subjective impressions. Has that SUV been bought outright, or is it leased, its driver uncertain how to meet the next payment? Are those on board the private jet its owners, or just a group of executives on a final trip just before they're sacked? Is the owner of the mansion up to his eyebrows in debt, his business about to go bankrupt?
We need to be able to define 'wealth' and 'income' objectively and look at measures to compare them across societies using robust methodologies based on hard data. The first chapter of the second part of McWilliams' book is the most technical, but is necessary to understand if one is to consider policy solutions to a problem with the potential to tear down society.
McWilliams looks at inequality through the prism of six different measures across different economies mostly from the Western world, plus India and China.
I won't spoil your read of the book by copying out league tables of income and wealth inequality across different countries. The important thing to note is that over time, things change; some countries have seen rising inequality over the past decades, in some it has stayed broadly the same, whilst others have seen it fall. Most, however, fall into the first category.
[You may ask how Poland is faring - it must be said that the Gini coefficient is falling, while over the same time, in the UK it has been rising, according to Eurostat...]
However, there has been a "huge fall in inequality in all measures between the late 19th or early 20th century and the late 20th century." "For the UK... the share of wealth of the top 1% ranged from 70% to 75% from 1895 to 1906, but bottomed out at 15.2% in 1984. There has been a small recovery to 19.8% in 2012". This is quite amazing. The two world wars have had an intense levelling effect on British society.
The next chapter addresses the paradox within the book's title. While inequality in rich countries in rich countries has been growing from its postwar lows, the world has seen "a quite extraordinary reduction in poverty". Define 'poverty', then. According to the World Bank, the current poverty line, set in 2015 is $1.90 (£1.45 / 7.22zł) a day. Below this level person is considered to be living in 'extreme poverty'. By this measure, by 2013, 10.9% of the world is living in extreme poverty - down from 44% in 1981 and 72% in 1950.
But living costs vary enormously from country to country. Malnourishment is a better measure of extreme poverty. And here too, progress. From 2000 to 2015, the percentage of human beings who are malnourished has fallen from 14.7% to 10.6%, according to the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation.
Globalisation has helped lift billions of people from extreme poverty. China and India, as the world's two most populous countries, have been at the forefront of this trend. Inward investment and local entrepreneurs producing products and services for global markets have created jobs on a massive scale. Despite rising populations, the number of paupers has fallen over the past three decades, in China far more dramatically than in India. Other populous countries across Asia have seen similar improvements. And further improvements are likely to continue happening, with the greatest pockets of poverty remaining in war-torn or failed states.
Yet this process of making "the poor in poor countries richer has been associated with falling real wages for poorer people in rich countries," and hence the paradox.
The next chapter looks at the complex relationship between inequality and economic growth. Do countries with less inequality grow faster than those with greater inequality - or vice versa? The answer is mixed. "The trick is not to make crude assumptions based on correlations... it seems to be the case that higher inequality is associated with less growth. So one might be tempted to raise taxes to redistribute from rich to poor to boost growth. But then one discovers that higher taxes are ... also associated with lower growth."
So if high inequality slows down growth, but higher taxation also slows down growth - what should policy makers do?
Some answers to follow - but first - who are the super rich, and what defines them.
This time last year
Jakubowizna in mid-winter
[This year - no snow, warmer spell forecast]
This two years ago:
Warm winter's day in Jakubowizna
This time three years ago:
Seeking an aesthetic in the Grim
This time four years ago:
UK overtakes France as the World's 5th Biggest Economy
This time seven years ago:
Ice in the Vistula
This time ten years ago:
A consolation to my British readers
This time 11 years ago:
Winter in its finery
The time 11 years ago:
Snow fences keep the trains running
But these are subjective impressions. Has that SUV been bought outright, or is it leased, its driver uncertain how to meet the next payment? Are those on board the private jet its owners, or just a group of executives on a final trip just before they're sacked? Is the owner of the mansion up to his eyebrows in debt, his business about to go bankrupt?
We need to be able to define 'wealth' and 'income' objectively and look at measures to compare them across societies using robust methodologies based on hard data. The first chapter of the second part of McWilliams' book is the most technical, but is necessary to understand if one is to consider policy solutions to a problem with the potential to tear down society.
McWilliams looks at inequality through the prism of six different measures across different economies mostly from the Western world, plus India and China.
- How much income is earned by the top 1% of earners?
- How much income is earned by the top 10% of earners?
- How much wealth is owned by the wealthiest 1%?
- How much wealth is owned by the wealthiest 10%?
- The Gini coefficient of income
- The Gini coefficient of wealth
I won't spoil your read of the book by copying out league tables of income and wealth inequality across different countries. The important thing to note is that over time, things change; some countries have seen rising inequality over the past decades, in some it has stayed broadly the same, whilst others have seen it fall. Most, however, fall into the first category.
[You may ask how Poland is faring - it must be said that the Gini coefficient is falling, while over the same time, in the UK it has been rising, according to Eurostat...]
However, there has been a "huge fall in inequality in all measures between the late 19th or early 20th century and the late 20th century." "For the UK... the share of wealth of the top 1% ranged from 70% to 75% from 1895 to 1906, but bottomed out at 15.2% in 1984. There has been a small recovery to 19.8% in 2012". This is quite amazing. The two world wars have had an intense levelling effect on British society.
The next chapter addresses the paradox within the book's title. While inequality in rich countries in rich countries has been growing from its postwar lows, the world has seen "a quite extraordinary reduction in poverty". Define 'poverty', then. According to the World Bank, the current poverty line, set in 2015 is $1.90 (£1.45 / 7.22zł) a day. Below this level person is considered to be living in 'extreme poverty'. By this measure, by 2013, 10.9% of the world is living in extreme poverty - down from 44% in 1981 and 72% in 1950.
But living costs vary enormously from country to country. Malnourishment is a better measure of extreme poverty. And here too, progress. From 2000 to 2015, the percentage of human beings who are malnourished has fallen from 14.7% to 10.6%, according to the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation.
Globalisation has helped lift billions of people from extreme poverty. China and India, as the world's two most populous countries, have been at the forefront of this trend. Inward investment and local entrepreneurs producing products and services for global markets have created jobs on a massive scale. Despite rising populations, the number of paupers has fallen over the past three decades, in China far more dramatically than in India. Other populous countries across Asia have seen similar improvements. And further improvements are likely to continue happening, with the greatest pockets of poverty remaining in war-torn or failed states.
Yet this process of making "the poor in poor countries richer has been associated with falling real wages for poorer people in rich countries," and hence the paradox.
The next chapter looks at the complex relationship between inequality and economic growth. Do countries with less inequality grow faster than those with greater inequality - or vice versa? The answer is mixed. "The trick is not to make crude assumptions based on correlations... it seems to be the case that higher inequality is associated with less growth. So one might be tempted to raise taxes to redistribute from rich to poor to boost growth. But then one discovers that higher taxes are ... also associated with lower growth."
So if high inequality slows down growth, but higher taxation also slows down growth - what should policy makers do?
Some answers to follow - but first - who are the super rich, and what defines them.
This time last year
Jakubowizna in mid-winter
[This year - no snow, warmer spell forecast]
This two years ago:
Warm winter's day in Jakubowizna
This time three years ago:
Seeking an aesthetic in the Grim
This time four years ago:
UK overtakes France as the World's 5th Biggest Economy
This time seven years ago:
Ice in the Vistula
This time ten years ago:
A consolation to my British readers
This time 11 years ago:
Winter in its finery
The time 11 years ago:
Snow fences keep the trains running
Sunday, 5 January 2020
The Inequality Paradox - Part I
Here's a book that drills down into one of the leading social phenomena of our time - why it is that the gulf between rich and poor is to be getting wider. Doug McWilliams' book is a cracking good read - well written (which means it's easy to understand and assimilate), extremely well researched and comprehensive in its depiction of the problem and the various policy solutions intended to remedy it. It's a book that should set any active mind racing - crammed with insights that set off trains of thought. If you are at all interested in how our society functions, it's worth a read. As such, the book deserves an in-depth review over the course of the next few blog posts.
Today I shall cover no more than the first part, Setting the Scene.
The book kicks off with football - a comparison of the earnings of Wayne Rooney with those of Sir Bobby Charlton, whom readers of my generation will remember as also having played for Manchester United, albeit some 40 years earlier. Both players contributed to their club's greatness, both scored a similar number of goals for England. Yet at the height of their careers, Rooney was earning £13,500,000 a year; Sir Bobby made £15,000. Allowing for inflation, "Rooney earned 53 times more relatively than Sir Bobby did for doing essentially the same job". In 1972, Sir Bobby earned eight times as much as players in lower leagues. In 2015, Rooney earned 45 times as much as players in lower leagues.
How did this come about? The reason lies in the two great drivers of inequality over the past half-century - technology and globalisation. Technology - in this case satellite TV - allows English football league matches to be shown to paying viewers around the world. The revenues of the world's best clubs no longer come only from fans within a train ride of the stadium. Rooney might have been earning 45 times more than Sir Bobby, but by 2015, Manchester United's revenue was 70 times higher (allowing for inflation) than it was in Sir Bobby's day.
Yet the paradox in the book's title is that while this is going on, the number of people living in absolute poverty in the world has been falling at the fastest rate ever - even as the concentration of wealth among the richest people increases. Between 1990 and 2013, the World Bank says that people living in 'extreme poverty' has fallen from 37.1% of humanity to 10.7%, while the overall population rose from 5.3 billion to 7.1 billion during those years. Taken in that perspective, one may think that given the vast number of human beings lifted out of abject poverty in such a short space of time is so wonderful that one needn't worry too much about a few thousand people gathering extreme amounts of wealth. And yet it is a worry - not least because of what that wealth can buy - power. Power over you and me.
Thomas Picketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century is a highly influential book, as McWilliams explains, spawning a great many economic studies into the causes of rising inequality. There are more causes than just the exploitation of the poor by the rich, the result of the accumulation of capital and bending the rules to favour the rich. The second chapter of part one looks at how economists from Adam Smith, Keynes, Hayek and Friedman looked at inequality and how it is considered today. The second chapter, an overview of serious economic studies of inequality, lifts this book from being yet another opinion from yet another pundit. This work is solidly grounded in economic number-crunching; it's much more than just random observations and anecdotes strung together to form a loose theory.
Adam Smith, as the founding father of modern economics makes pertinent observations as to how the rich should behave, the notion of 'equity' - fairness, and the avoidance of entitlement as a way of thinking among the rich. And Smith's 'invisible hand' - which requires competition and trade, creates positive net economic outcomes. "My attempts to make myself better off generates wealth of other people provided that they trade freely with me as suppliers or customers." [Good stuff. It reminds me of the 'double thank-you of capitalism', coined by TV pundit John Stossel: "How many times have you paid $1 for a cup of coffee and after the clerk said, 'Thank you,' you responded, 'Thank you'? Why does it happen? Because you want the coffee more than the buck, and the store wants the buck more than the coffee. Both of you win." Coffee's coffee. But there are many instances where there's no thank-you from the buyer - because they feel forced to buy something (like additional insurance) or pay more than they feel is fair.]
John Maynard Keynes points out that "if an excessive proportion of income accrues to the rich, this might lead to underconsumption because of the lower propensity of the rich to consume. Keynes distinguished between the entrepreneurs and the rentier class, the latter being parasitic, the former benefiting society by way of their 'intelligence, determination and executive skill'. The underconsumption point dilutes the trickle-down wealth theory. Once you hit a certain wealth level, you have so much money you can no longer spend it on things you need or even want - you just park the surplus money where it is of no benefit to the shopkeeper, craftsman, tradesman or builder.
Here I am thinking of the extreme salary of Denise Coates, CEO of Bet365, who last year was paid £323m. In one year. Whatever could she do with the money? She has five children. One day, they could become extremely wealthy. How much of that £323m earned in 2018 will trickle down?
Milton Friedman's famous phrase is mentioned: "A society that puts equality ahead of freedom... will end up with neither equality nor freedom. The use of force to achieve equality will destroy freedom, and the force... will end up in the hands who use it to promote their own interests". Something that Eastern Europe knows only too well from its postwar history.
More modern economists cited by McWilliams include Jeffery Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman for their insights into inequality. The broad overview of how economists past and present see the subject make for a solid foundation for the rest of the book.
In the third chapter, McWilliams points out that inequality has different causes, which need to be distinguished.
Two forms of equality should naturally lie beyond the scope of this discussion. Equal legal protection for rich and poor is enshrined in law and should be taken as a given. As should equality of opportunity - human potential must not be stifled because a person's provenance or birth. Noble born or humble, black or white, male of female - everyone should have the chance to develop and profit from their talents, innate and developed.
But about equality of outcomes?
Should everyone's income be the same, regardless of what they do? Is it desirable that each human's wealth be the same? If this is indeed so - how can such a situation be achieved without wrecking the economy and damaging society? Would such policy goals be acceptable to the electorate? OK then - maybe not identical outcomes - but outcomes which are less glaringly unequal? McWilliams quotes the Times' economic correspondent David Smith: "people are relaxed about inequality as long as their own position is improving. But when they believe their own position is deteriorating, they assume that inequality is rising... and blame inequality for their own problems."
So what causes inequality? McWilliams identifies four types:
The second type happens when the business owners in developed economies close down factories or service centres and move them to developing countries with lower wages. Less-skilled work evaporates from rich countries but helps lift people in poor countries out of poverty. The business owners increase their wealth, while rich countries' poor get poorer. [In practice, the 'business owners' are both rich individuals as well as ordinary folk - pension-fund savers.]
The third type is caused by technology. The transformation to digital thus far has increased productivity at the cost of old-school employment, but creating new jobs. However, further advances in tech (robotics, AI) will drive down overall employment, as robots get to build robots, and machine-learning AI programs will get to build new programs. Again, it will be business owners that get richer as this process accelerates.
The fourth type is hereditary. McWilliams says this is a relatively new phenomenon, sparked by the broadening of tertiary education to women after WW2. These days, university graduates overwhelmingly marry other graduates, bringing up their young differently to those without tertiary education. These 'superbabies' will be born wealthier and will stay wealthier than the children of parents who didn't go to university.
Why does any of this matter? Why are we banging on about inequality? Some could argue that it's a natural condition of mankind - nay, of any animal - after all pecking orders exist in all animal societies. There's been inequality throughout human history - just look at the Egyptian pyramids! Sometimes inequality decreases - after the Black Death and the Great Plague; after the French and Russian revolutions; after the world wars of the last century. But generally, it has a natural tendency to increase. So what?
McWilliams explains why growing inequality is a bad thing for society. Despair and alienation, health inequality and falling life expectancy are symptoms of rising inequality. Weakening social cohesion and its political fall-out can severely damage nations. He quotes Prof Jane Mansbridge writing in the Washington Post: "the extraordinary growth in incomes at the top of the income distribution makes possible the discretionary money that can be poured into politics, and those who contribute to politics are, on average, a good deal more extreme in their views than the average voter."
If you earned $200m last year, the temptation to buy think-tanks, influence the public discourse through the media and propagate your political views far and wide becomes overwhelming. And if your worldview is that the the rich are entitled to get richer without leftie do-gooders getting in the way, so be it. Money becomes power. More power becomes more money. More money becomes more power. And so inequality grows inexorably... Is there a solution?
My long-form review of The Inequality Paradox continues here with Part II.
In the meanwhile, some good stuff here from The Economist ('Have billionaires accumulated their wealth illegally?')
This time last year:
From West London to South Warsaw
This time four years ago:
Anger and hate have no place in political discourse
This time six years ago:
Is Conservatism rural or urban in nature?
This time seven years ago:
Poland's roads get slightly less deadly
This time eight years ago:
It's expensive being rich in Warsaw
This time ten years:
Winter commuting in colour and black & white
This time 11 years ago:
Zamienie in winter
This time 12 years ago:
Really cold (-12C at night)
[last night's low: +2C]
Today I shall cover no more than the first part, Setting the Scene.
The book kicks off with football - a comparison of the earnings of Wayne Rooney with those of Sir Bobby Charlton, whom readers of my generation will remember as also having played for Manchester United, albeit some 40 years earlier. Both players contributed to their club's greatness, both scored a similar number of goals for England. Yet at the height of their careers, Rooney was earning £13,500,000 a year; Sir Bobby made £15,000. Allowing for inflation, "Rooney earned 53 times more relatively than Sir Bobby did for doing essentially the same job". In 1972, Sir Bobby earned eight times as much as players in lower leagues. In 2015, Rooney earned 45 times as much as players in lower leagues.
How did this come about? The reason lies in the two great drivers of inequality over the past half-century - technology and globalisation. Technology - in this case satellite TV - allows English football league matches to be shown to paying viewers around the world. The revenues of the world's best clubs no longer come only from fans within a train ride of the stadium. Rooney might have been earning 45 times more than Sir Bobby, but by 2015, Manchester United's revenue was 70 times higher (allowing for inflation) than it was in Sir Bobby's day.
* * * * * * * *
Between 2000 and 2017, the number of billionaires in the world has grown more than four-fold (from 470 to 2,043), despite the impact of the financial crash of 2008. [WealthX Billionaire Census 2019 gives the number of individuals with net wealth over over $1 billion as 2,604.] It is not only the number of billionaires that's rising, but the number of billions they possess is growing too.Yet the paradox in the book's title is that while this is going on, the number of people living in absolute poverty in the world has been falling at the fastest rate ever - even as the concentration of wealth among the richest people increases. Between 1990 and 2013, the World Bank says that people living in 'extreme poverty' has fallen from 37.1% of humanity to 10.7%, while the overall population rose from 5.3 billion to 7.1 billion during those years. Taken in that perspective, one may think that given the vast number of human beings lifted out of abject poverty in such a short space of time is so wonderful that one needn't worry too much about a few thousand people gathering extreme amounts of wealth. And yet it is a worry - not least because of what that wealth can buy - power. Power over you and me.
Thomas Picketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century is a highly influential book, as McWilliams explains, spawning a great many economic studies into the causes of rising inequality. There are more causes than just the exploitation of the poor by the rich, the result of the accumulation of capital and bending the rules to favour the rich. The second chapter of part one looks at how economists from Adam Smith, Keynes, Hayek and Friedman looked at inequality and how it is considered today. The second chapter, an overview of serious economic studies of inequality, lifts this book from being yet another opinion from yet another pundit. This work is solidly grounded in economic number-crunching; it's much more than just random observations and anecdotes strung together to form a loose theory.
Adam Smith, as the founding father of modern economics makes pertinent observations as to how the rich should behave, the notion of 'equity' - fairness, and the avoidance of entitlement as a way of thinking among the rich. And Smith's 'invisible hand' - which requires competition and trade, creates positive net economic outcomes. "My attempts to make myself better off generates wealth of other people provided that they trade freely with me as suppliers or customers." [Good stuff. It reminds me of the 'double thank-you of capitalism', coined by TV pundit John Stossel: "How many times have you paid $1 for a cup of coffee and after the clerk said, 'Thank you,' you responded, 'Thank you'? Why does it happen? Because you want the coffee more than the buck, and the store wants the buck more than the coffee. Both of you win." Coffee's coffee. But there are many instances where there's no thank-you from the buyer - because they feel forced to buy something (like additional insurance) or pay more than they feel is fair.]
John Maynard Keynes points out that "if an excessive proportion of income accrues to the rich, this might lead to underconsumption because of the lower propensity of the rich to consume. Keynes distinguished between the entrepreneurs and the rentier class, the latter being parasitic, the former benefiting society by way of their 'intelligence, determination and executive skill'. The underconsumption point dilutes the trickle-down wealth theory. Once you hit a certain wealth level, you have so much money you can no longer spend it on things you need or even want - you just park the surplus money where it is of no benefit to the shopkeeper, craftsman, tradesman or builder.
Here I am thinking of the extreme salary of Denise Coates, CEO of Bet365, who last year was paid £323m. In one year. Whatever could she do with the money? She has five children. One day, they could become extremely wealthy. How much of that £323m earned in 2018 will trickle down?
Milton Friedman's famous phrase is mentioned: "A society that puts equality ahead of freedom... will end up with neither equality nor freedom. The use of force to achieve equality will destroy freedom, and the force... will end up in the hands who use it to promote their own interests". Something that Eastern Europe knows only too well from its postwar history.
More modern economists cited by McWilliams include Jeffery Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman for their insights into inequality. The broad overview of how economists past and present see the subject make for a solid foundation for the rest of the book.
In the third chapter, McWilliams points out that inequality has different causes, which need to be distinguished.
Two forms of equality should naturally lie beyond the scope of this discussion. Equal legal protection for rich and poor is enshrined in law and should be taken as a given. As should equality of opportunity - human potential must not be stifled because a person's provenance or birth. Noble born or humble, black or white, male of female - everyone should have the chance to develop and profit from their talents, innate and developed.
But about equality of outcomes?
Should everyone's income be the same, regardless of what they do? Is it desirable that each human's wealth be the same? If this is indeed so - how can such a situation be achieved without wrecking the economy and damaging society? Would such policy goals be acceptable to the electorate? OK then - maybe not identical outcomes - but outcomes which are less glaringly unequal? McWilliams quotes the Times' economic correspondent David Smith: "people are relaxed about inequality as long as their own position is improving. But when they believe their own position is deteriorating, they assume that inequality is rising... and blame inequality for their own problems."
So what causes inequality? McWilliams identifies four types:
- Inequality caused by increased exploitation
- Inequality caused by early-stage globalisation
- Inequality caused by technology
- Inherited inequality
The second type happens when the business owners in developed economies close down factories or service centres and move them to developing countries with lower wages. Less-skilled work evaporates from rich countries but helps lift people in poor countries out of poverty. The business owners increase their wealth, while rich countries' poor get poorer. [In practice, the 'business owners' are both rich individuals as well as ordinary folk - pension-fund savers.]
The third type is caused by technology. The transformation to digital thus far has increased productivity at the cost of old-school employment, but creating new jobs. However, further advances in tech (robotics, AI) will drive down overall employment, as robots get to build robots, and machine-learning AI programs will get to build new programs. Again, it will be business owners that get richer as this process accelerates.
The fourth type is hereditary. McWilliams says this is a relatively new phenomenon, sparked by the broadening of tertiary education to women after WW2. These days, university graduates overwhelmingly marry other graduates, bringing up their young differently to those without tertiary education. These 'superbabies' will be born wealthier and will stay wealthier than the children of parents who didn't go to university.
Why does any of this matter? Why are we banging on about inequality? Some could argue that it's a natural condition of mankind - nay, of any animal - after all pecking orders exist in all animal societies. There's been inequality throughout human history - just look at the Egyptian pyramids! Sometimes inequality decreases - after the Black Death and the Great Plague; after the French and Russian revolutions; after the world wars of the last century. But generally, it has a natural tendency to increase. So what?
McWilliams explains why growing inequality is a bad thing for society. Despair and alienation, health inequality and falling life expectancy are symptoms of rising inequality. Weakening social cohesion and its political fall-out can severely damage nations. He quotes Prof Jane Mansbridge writing in the Washington Post: "the extraordinary growth in incomes at the top of the income distribution makes possible the discretionary money that can be poured into politics, and those who contribute to politics are, on average, a good deal more extreme in their views than the average voter."
If you earned $200m last year, the temptation to buy think-tanks, influence the public discourse through the media and propagate your political views far and wide becomes overwhelming. And if your worldview is that the the rich are entitled to get richer without leftie do-gooders getting in the way, so be it. Money becomes power. More power becomes more money. More money becomes more power. And so inequality grows inexorably... Is there a solution?
My long-form review of The Inequality Paradox continues here with Part II.
In the meanwhile, some good stuff here from The Economist ('Have billionaires accumulated their wealth illegally?')
This time last year:
From West London to South Warsaw
This time four years ago:
Anger and hate have no place in political discourse
This time six years ago:
Is Conservatism rural or urban in nature?
This time seven years ago:
Poland's roads get slightly less deadly
This time eight years ago:
It's expensive being rich in Warsaw
This time ten years:
Winter commuting in colour and black & white
This time 11 years ago:
Zamienie in winter
This time 12 years ago:
Really cold (-12C at night)
[last night's low: +2C]
Wednesday, 1 January 2020
Wealth and inequality - an introduction
As we enter the 2020s, rising inequality across the developed world will be a theme that will run through the public discourse. In particular its effects on society - and the correct policy responses to it - will be much discussed by politicians and policy makers.
French economist Thomas Picketty's book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, has been hugely influential since it came out in 2013, maybe one of the most influential books of the past decade. I suspect, however, that much like Marx's Das Kapital, it has been more talked about than read. I have heard that it is a boring and plodding read. "If you can't write using short words in short sentences, you can't write." [That's my quote, there.] Picketty's essential argument is that you make more money by making your wealth work for you than you do from working. This, he claims, is why rich people are getting richer and the gap between rich and poor is widening.
Looking at the rise of the phenomenon of the family office, suggests that Picketty may have a point. After the financial crisis of 2009, many wealthy families with $100m or more to look after are no longer entrusting the money to third parties such as private banking, but rather hiring their own fund manager(s) to make their assets work for them. Often these are the same people that once looked after their account at the bank, but now they've been made a tempting offer to leave the bank, cut out the middleman, and work for the family directly.
The media is full of stories about how the top 1% of humanity owned 80% or 90% or more of the world's wealth, and how that's been rising, while the just-about-managing class are finding life ever-harder. Here's a sample: In an era of hyper-wealth, economy-class rich starts at $25 million. (This just popped up in my Facebook feed as I'm going over this post prior to publishing.)
What's the real picture? How does all this affect our daily lives?
An excellent antidote to Picketty is Douglas McWilliams' book The Inequality Paradox. The book's central point is that indeed, the gap between rich and poor has grown bigger - though at the same time billions of people lifted out of abject poverty over the past half-century. Globalisation and new technologies have been the main drivers.
Reading The Inequality Paradox has sparked off so many trains of thought that I have decided to review it over the course of several blog posts, each one an essay based on one of the book's four parts, plus a summary.
But first, I need to start with a personal reflection about wealth. It is from this basis that I shall be commenting on the book, on issues of wealth and inequality. The Polish saying 'punkt widzenia zależy od punktu siedzenia' (your personal circumstances shape your point of view) is all important in this debate. You must understand this to see where I'm coming from...
After the war, my parents ended up in the UK in 1947 with literally nothing - no money, no language, no homeland to return to. Yet within eight years, they had moved into a three-bedroom end-terrace house, which cost £600 at the time, with a very manageable mortgage. By 1955, they were earning good money by postwar UK standards, my father as a civil engineer, my mother even more as a comptometer operator. She gave up her job for a ten-year maternity gap when I was born two years later. In 1970, we moved into a detached house in a posher area. My parents raised two sons, both of whom went on to university and postgraduate studies; they lived a comfortable though frugal life (no fancy foreign holidays, no flash cars, no extravagance). My father worked until he was nearly 70, quitting his job to become a grandfather, and died at 96.
Thinking back on their lives, one thought eclipses all others - they found themselves in the right place in the right time. Britain was rebuilding, and for hard-working people with the determination to get on, the odds were on their side - regardless of provenance. As I wrote the other day, my parents' first house cost slightly less than one year's net salary of my father, just four years into his professional career. Their second house, bought in 1970, cost five times my father's after-tax salary; house-price inflation was just beginning to kick in. That same house now costs a multiple of 26 times what a senior civil engineer with 19 years' experience earns today after tax. (Housing's not the only cost that's rocketed. Not only was my entire education paid for by the state, I also got a student grant. Compare that with the child of today's senior civil engineer going to a UK university and typically ending up with £45,000 of student debt.)
My own wealth is based on the purchase and sale of a house in London. I bought it in 1982, a little more than a year after I'd started my first job. At the time, the terraced house cost £28,500. This was by now a multiple of eight times my net salary. With the 10% deposit paid for by the Bank of Mum and Dad, I was onto a winner. Less lucky were my friends who didn't rush to get a first foot on the housing ladder. By the late 1980s, at the top of the boom, house prices had risen far faster than earnings, and paying off the mortgage became much easier after I'd got married in 1988. Still, there was a correction in the early 1990s, with the end of double mortgage interest relief at source (MIRAS), and the coining of the term 'negative equity' (people owing their mortgage lender more than the property was worth). But London property prices kept on rising...
In 1997, with a young family and an interesting job offer in Poland, I decided to jack in a stable career at the CBI (I'd been there for 16 years by then) and emigrate. The house in London proved to be a huge asset - we paid off the remaining mortgage with savings (having made some money on Thatcher's mass privatisations and on unit-trust investments), and it was rented out.
My first five years in Poland were spent working on typical expat director's packages - incredibly generous in hindsight, with children's schooling and family healthcare included. In this respect, I too was in the right place in the right time, though out of choice. Polish speakers with Western managerial experience that could be trusted by foreign investors were at a premium in the 1990s. And when things went wrong (a merger, then the dot-com bubble bursting) there were handsome payouts.
That money went straight into property. In late 1999, we bought land, by 2002 we moved into our own home after five years' renting. Our brand new detached house was vastly better than anything we could have dreamed of in London. The same distance from the centre of the capital, and yet much bigger, on a vastly bigger plot. New, warm, insulated, all mod cons, sauna, walk-in wardrobe, big garage. All for the same money as a studio flat in Ruislip, 25km from the centre of London. (Yes! £250,000 vs 1,250,000 zlotys.)
A small mortgage (paid off in 14 years) covered the cost of finishing the house. Our children went to a posh Polish private primary and junior-high school (in hindsight, a mistake, they say) that cost about three times less in fees than expat schools in Warsaw. Their senior-highs were both state schools with better university admission results than the private senior-high.
The car I bought in 1993, a one-litre Nissan Micra, served for all the school runs, and was finally sold for scrap at the age of 20, not to be replaced. My three custom motorbikes are a nod to the vintage years, albeit with modern underpinnings, and do not serve as a mode of transport, rather a fine-weather summer mode of exploring the Polish countryside.
Back in the UK, chancellor George Osborne imposed capital gains tax on proceeds of sales of property owned by non-residents. This measure was announced in the Autumn Statement of 2013 and came into force at the beginning of the 2014-2015 tax year. Time to cash in; a price of £380,000 was agreed and the house was sold in early 2014. We split that money 50/50; I invested my half in a flat in Łódź and a place in the country with an acre of land - and bought some motorbikes and had them done up. The rest is rainy-day money with instant access.
After moving to Poland, I was advised to keep paying my UK National Insurance contributions. In 2014, 40 years after starting my first summer job (working in a canteen kitchen for £18 a week net), I got a letter from National Insurance. It said I'd paid enough contributions to be eligible for the basic UK state pension on reaching my retirement age of 66 (in just under four years' time). Great! I shall also be getting a meagre Polish state pension, plus my UK private pension built up over my 16 years at the CBI. As you can imagine, with so much of my savings in sterling, I keep a constant eye on the pound/zloty exchange rate. [Disclosure - there's also my parents' house, currently in probate, valued at £900,000. It is to be inhabited by my son and used as a London base by my brother's son, so intergenerational wealth gives our boys an immediate advantage over out-of-towners trying to start their careers in London.]
Why all this transparency about my personal financial situation? Tot this all up, it's hardly an impressive sum by UK standards, where many of my British-born friends have seen money cascading down to them from more than just one previous generation, and whose careers in high-paying London jobs have brought in far more money than mine has. But I'm not in the UK, I'm in Poland. And it's here that my wealth is judged.
This brings me to the famous 1995 survey by the Harvard School of Public Health (cited here), asking staff and students if they'd rather earn $50,000 a year where their friends and neighbours earn $25,000, or if they'd rather earn $100,000 a year where the others earn $200,000. The result was a near 50/50 split, with one half preferring to have the additional purchasing power, whilst the other preferred to have more relative to others, even if than meant having less in absolute terms. Positional vs. absolute wealth. Here in Poland, I found positional wealth.
Money buys options, it give you the ability to choose. It also buys you comfort - and here is the key. For most people, in most cultures, there is a 'comfort level' above which the striving stops. "I have all that I need, plus a substantial safety-net in reserve, so I no longer need to push myself to acquire more." This happens at an individual level. And here I shall get controversial. I also believe it can happen at a national level. Just as you can measure the average, mean or median height, weight or demographic age of a population, so, I believe, you should be able to compare the drive of its people. I believe that the dramatic slow-down in economic growth witnessed in Japan post-1992 was due in part to its people feeling sufficiently well-off after 45 years of graft to, well, slow down. What more can you buy or own?
The drive, the determination in Polish society is great. Some of this is down to being a nation in the fast lane to catch up with its Western neighbours. Some of it is down to demographics. The largest group of Poles today by age are the 37-year-olds, born in 1983. There's nearly 700,000 of them. [By contrast, the smallest by age of the younger group are the 17-year-olds, born in 2003. There's only 350,000 of them.] The 1983 cohort was entering the labour market at the time when unemployment was over 20%. Sharp elbows were needed to survive and thrive. Today's young enter the labour market when registered unemployment is 5.1% nationally and around 2% in most big cities.
Wealth and inequality are not just about the rich and the poor. These measures affect a broad spectrum of drivers. At one end are the poor, who need to toil and sweat to keep body and soul together. As they escape the grinding burden of absolute poverty - if they can see the sense of hard work and focus on investing in oneself - they can begin to build a life around higher needs. Maslow's pyramid. But once they get comfortable, many will question the need for further striving. Not so the super-rich. The super-rich have more than enough but want more.
During the dot-com boom of the early 2000s, there emerged the notion of 'fuck-you money', said to be around $10m, a level at which the entrepreneur who's just sold their start-up can literally say 'fuck you' to anyone, be it a rival entrepreneur, the bank or the taxman. OK, so you've made $10m. More money than can be spent in a lifetime, even if just left on deposit or invested in government bonds.
Not so! Today there are houses in London costing £20m, £40m! But you need another property - Swiss Alps, maybe, the Caribbean. Swanky places, to impress, you understand. And private jet to get you there. Staff. Loyal people - well-paid. A family office costs around $1m a year to function; you need $100m, and you count on your fund manager to get a yield of 8%, 9% on those investments each year.
So what drives people who've got that and more to push themselves all-out (and often at the expense of people around them) to strive for a billion? Or to go from that billion to five or six or more billion dollars? Few have the motivation to push themselves that hard.
I don't know. I don't have the motivation - I'm comfortable. I don't want to buy political power, I'm not driven by any great sense of exploring the world or buying more property or motorbikes (well, maybe one or two more. Small ones.) I am an ascetic; my material needs are few. Joy I seek rather than pleasure; sustainability is all-important to me.
So all this is by way of a personal preamble; now to go into the Inequality Paradox.
This time last year:
Gratitude for a peaceful 2018
[Yet another one in 2019. Fingers crossed for 2020!]
This time two years ago:
Fighting laziness - a perennial resolution
This time three years ago:
A Year of Round Anniversaries
This time four years ago:
Walking on frozen water
This time five years ago:
Fireworks herald 2015 in Jeziorki
This time six years ago
Jeziorki welcomes 2014
This time seven years ago:
LOT's second Dreamliner over Jeziorki
This time nine years ago:
New Year's coal train
This time 11 years ago:
Welcome to 2009!
This time 12 years ago:
Happy 2008!
French economist Thomas Picketty's book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, has been hugely influential since it came out in 2013, maybe one of the most influential books of the past decade. I suspect, however, that much like Marx's Das Kapital, it has been more talked about than read. I have heard that it is a boring and plodding read. "If you can't write using short words in short sentences, you can't write." [That's my quote, there.] Picketty's essential argument is that you make more money by making your wealth work for you than you do from working. This, he claims, is why rich people are getting richer and the gap between rich and poor is widening.
Looking at the rise of the phenomenon of the family office, suggests that Picketty may have a point. After the financial crisis of 2009, many wealthy families with $100m or more to look after are no longer entrusting the money to third parties such as private banking, but rather hiring their own fund manager(s) to make their assets work for them. Often these are the same people that once looked after their account at the bank, but now they've been made a tempting offer to leave the bank, cut out the middleman, and work for the family directly.
The media is full of stories about how the top 1% of humanity owned 80% or 90% or more of the world's wealth, and how that's been rising, while the just-about-managing class are finding life ever-harder. Here's a sample: In an era of hyper-wealth, economy-class rich starts at $25 million. (This just popped up in my Facebook feed as I'm going over this post prior to publishing.)
What's the real picture? How does all this affect our daily lives?
An excellent antidote to Picketty is Douglas McWilliams' book The Inequality Paradox. The book's central point is that indeed, the gap between rich and poor has grown bigger - though at the same time billions of people lifted out of abject poverty over the past half-century. Globalisation and new technologies have been the main drivers.
Reading The Inequality Paradox has sparked off so many trains of thought that I have decided to review it over the course of several blog posts, each one an essay based on one of the book's four parts, plus a summary.
But first, I need to start with a personal reflection about wealth. It is from this basis that I shall be commenting on the book, on issues of wealth and inequality. The Polish saying 'punkt widzenia zależy od punktu siedzenia' (your personal circumstances shape your point of view) is all important in this debate. You must understand this to see where I'm coming from...
After the war, my parents ended up in the UK in 1947 with literally nothing - no money, no language, no homeland to return to. Yet within eight years, they had moved into a three-bedroom end-terrace house, which cost £600 at the time, with a very manageable mortgage. By 1955, they were earning good money by postwar UK standards, my father as a civil engineer, my mother even more as a comptometer operator. She gave up her job for a ten-year maternity gap when I was born two years later. In 1970, we moved into a detached house in a posher area. My parents raised two sons, both of whom went on to university and postgraduate studies; they lived a comfortable though frugal life (no fancy foreign holidays, no flash cars, no extravagance). My father worked until he was nearly 70, quitting his job to become a grandfather, and died at 96.
Thinking back on their lives, one thought eclipses all others - they found themselves in the right place in the right time. Britain was rebuilding, and for hard-working people with the determination to get on, the odds were on their side - regardless of provenance. As I wrote the other day, my parents' first house cost slightly less than one year's net salary of my father, just four years into his professional career. Their second house, bought in 1970, cost five times my father's after-tax salary; house-price inflation was just beginning to kick in. That same house now costs a multiple of 26 times what a senior civil engineer with 19 years' experience earns today after tax. (Housing's not the only cost that's rocketed. Not only was my entire education paid for by the state, I also got a student grant. Compare that with the child of today's senior civil engineer going to a UK university and typically ending up with £45,000 of student debt.)
My own wealth is based on the purchase and sale of a house in London. I bought it in 1982, a little more than a year after I'd started my first job. At the time, the terraced house cost £28,500. This was by now a multiple of eight times my net salary. With the 10% deposit paid for by the Bank of Mum and Dad, I was onto a winner. Less lucky were my friends who didn't rush to get a first foot on the housing ladder. By the late 1980s, at the top of the boom, house prices had risen far faster than earnings, and paying off the mortgage became much easier after I'd got married in 1988. Still, there was a correction in the early 1990s, with the end of double mortgage interest relief at source (MIRAS), and the coining of the term 'negative equity' (people owing their mortgage lender more than the property was worth). But London property prices kept on rising...
In 1997, with a young family and an interesting job offer in Poland, I decided to jack in a stable career at the CBI (I'd been there for 16 years by then) and emigrate. The house in London proved to be a huge asset - we paid off the remaining mortgage with savings (having made some money on Thatcher's mass privatisations and on unit-trust investments), and it was rented out.
My first five years in Poland were spent working on typical expat director's packages - incredibly generous in hindsight, with children's schooling and family healthcare included. In this respect, I too was in the right place in the right time, though out of choice. Polish speakers with Western managerial experience that could be trusted by foreign investors were at a premium in the 1990s. And when things went wrong (a merger, then the dot-com bubble bursting) there were handsome payouts.
That money went straight into property. In late 1999, we bought land, by 2002 we moved into our own home after five years' renting. Our brand new detached house was vastly better than anything we could have dreamed of in London. The same distance from the centre of the capital, and yet much bigger, on a vastly bigger plot. New, warm, insulated, all mod cons, sauna, walk-in wardrobe, big garage. All for the same money as a studio flat in Ruislip, 25km from the centre of London. (Yes! £250,000 vs 1,250,000 zlotys.)
A small mortgage (paid off in 14 years) covered the cost of finishing the house. Our children went to a posh Polish private primary and junior-high school (in hindsight, a mistake, they say) that cost about three times less in fees than expat schools in Warsaw. Their senior-highs were both state schools with better university admission results than the private senior-high.
The car I bought in 1993, a one-litre Nissan Micra, served for all the school runs, and was finally sold for scrap at the age of 20, not to be replaced. My three custom motorbikes are a nod to the vintage years, albeit with modern underpinnings, and do not serve as a mode of transport, rather a fine-weather summer mode of exploring the Polish countryside.
Back in the UK, chancellor George Osborne imposed capital gains tax on proceeds of sales of property owned by non-residents. This measure was announced in the Autumn Statement of 2013 and came into force at the beginning of the 2014-2015 tax year. Time to cash in; a price of £380,000 was agreed and the house was sold in early 2014. We split that money 50/50; I invested my half in a flat in Łódź and a place in the country with an acre of land - and bought some motorbikes and had them done up. The rest is rainy-day money with instant access.
After moving to Poland, I was advised to keep paying my UK National Insurance contributions. In 2014, 40 years after starting my first summer job (working in a canteen kitchen for £18 a week net), I got a letter from National Insurance. It said I'd paid enough contributions to be eligible for the basic UK state pension on reaching my retirement age of 66 (in just under four years' time). Great! I shall also be getting a meagre Polish state pension, plus my UK private pension built up over my 16 years at the CBI. As you can imagine, with so much of my savings in sterling, I keep a constant eye on the pound/zloty exchange rate. [Disclosure - there's also my parents' house, currently in probate, valued at £900,000. It is to be inhabited by my son and used as a London base by my brother's son, so intergenerational wealth gives our boys an immediate advantage over out-of-towners trying to start their careers in London.]
Why all this transparency about my personal financial situation? Tot this all up, it's hardly an impressive sum by UK standards, where many of my British-born friends have seen money cascading down to them from more than just one previous generation, and whose careers in high-paying London jobs have brought in far more money than mine has. But I'm not in the UK, I'm in Poland. And it's here that my wealth is judged.
This brings me to the famous 1995 survey by the Harvard School of Public Health (cited here), asking staff and students if they'd rather earn $50,000 a year where their friends and neighbours earn $25,000, or if they'd rather earn $100,000 a year where the others earn $200,000. The result was a near 50/50 split, with one half preferring to have the additional purchasing power, whilst the other preferred to have more relative to others, even if than meant having less in absolute terms. Positional vs. absolute wealth. Here in Poland, I found positional wealth.
Money buys options, it give you the ability to choose. It also buys you comfort - and here is the key. For most people, in most cultures, there is a 'comfort level' above which the striving stops. "I have all that I need, plus a substantial safety-net in reserve, so I no longer need to push myself to acquire more." This happens at an individual level. And here I shall get controversial. I also believe it can happen at a national level. Just as you can measure the average, mean or median height, weight or demographic age of a population, so, I believe, you should be able to compare the drive of its people. I believe that the dramatic slow-down in economic growth witnessed in Japan post-1992 was due in part to its people feeling sufficiently well-off after 45 years of graft to, well, slow down. What more can you buy or own?
The drive, the determination in Polish society is great. Some of this is down to being a nation in the fast lane to catch up with its Western neighbours. Some of it is down to demographics. The largest group of Poles today by age are the 37-year-olds, born in 1983. There's nearly 700,000 of them. [By contrast, the smallest by age of the younger group are the 17-year-olds, born in 2003. There's only 350,000 of them.] The 1983 cohort was entering the labour market at the time when unemployment was over 20%. Sharp elbows were needed to survive and thrive. Today's young enter the labour market when registered unemployment is 5.1% nationally and around 2% in most big cities.
Wealth and inequality are not just about the rich and the poor. These measures affect a broad spectrum of drivers. At one end are the poor, who need to toil and sweat to keep body and soul together. As they escape the grinding burden of absolute poverty - if they can see the sense of hard work and focus on investing in oneself - they can begin to build a life around higher needs. Maslow's pyramid. But once they get comfortable, many will question the need for further striving. Not so the super-rich. The super-rich have more than enough but want more.
During the dot-com boom of the early 2000s, there emerged the notion of 'fuck-you money', said to be around $10m, a level at which the entrepreneur who's just sold their start-up can literally say 'fuck you' to anyone, be it a rival entrepreneur, the bank or the taxman. OK, so you've made $10m. More money than can be spent in a lifetime, even if just left on deposit or invested in government bonds.
Not so! Today there are houses in London costing £20m, £40m! But you need another property - Swiss Alps, maybe, the Caribbean. Swanky places, to impress, you understand. And private jet to get you there. Staff. Loyal people - well-paid. A family office costs around $1m a year to function; you need $100m, and you count on your fund manager to get a yield of 8%, 9% on those investments each year.
So what drives people who've got that and more to push themselves all-out (and often at the expense of people around them) to strive for a billion? Or to go from that billion to five or six or more billion dollars? Few have the motivation to push themselves that hard.
I don't know. I don't have the motivation - I'm comfortable. I don't want to buy political power, I'm not driven by any great sense of exploring the world or buying more property or motorbikes (well, maybe one or two more. Small ones.) I am an ascetic; my material needs are few. Joy I seek rather than pleasure; sustainability is all-important to me.
So all this is by way of a personal preamble; now to go into the Inequality Paradox.
This time last year:
Gratitude for a peaceful 2018
[Yet another one in 2019. Fingers crossed for 2020!]
This time two years ago:
Fighting laziness - a perennial resolution
This time three years ago:
A Year of Round Anniversaries
This time four years ago:
Walking on frozen water
This time five years ago:
Fireworks herald 2015 in Jeziorki
This time six years ago
Jeziorki welcomes 2014
This time seven years ago:
LOT's second Dreamliner over Jeziorki
This time nine years ago:
New Year's coal train
This time 11 years ago:
Welcome to 2009!
This time 12 years ago:
Happy 2008!
Tuesday, 31 December 2019
2019 - a year in numbers
Will 2019 have been my peak year? On every measure, every one has been beaten. Walking more, drinking less, doing more exercise, eating more fresh fruit & veg. Daily walking - I cracked 12,000 paces a day, every day, on average. An hour-and-half to two hours a day, every day. Throughout the entire year.
Six years of daily measurement, augmented in the past three years by the Huawei Health App (according to which, I'm 'better' than 99.99% of users). "Beat yesterday" is Garmin's slogan. "Beat last year" is mine. Long-term rather than short-term metrics count.
So how did I do this year? Pretty good! What's the secret? The key is to never miss a day's 10,000 - with that as a basis, everything else builds up as a bonus. Compared to previous years, this year saw no great walkathons; several 20,000+ days, but nothing spectacular. Not in the table below - was 'moderate to high intensity' walking, of which every day this year I did an average of 24 minutes, according to Huawei Health. This metric was introduced to the app in November 2018. It's made me walk just that little bit faster.
Bit of product placement here - pretty much every one of those 4.3 million paces I walked outdoors this year was in a pair of Loake shoes. No trainers, no wellies, no hiking boots - just four pairs of Loakes. Two pairs black, for office use, two pairs of ankle boots, for country walking.
Less alcohol consumed - still way off the NHS guidelines of 14 units a week, but a huge reduction from my late 50s, when in my first year of monitoring consumption, I averaged over 33 units a week. Key here is not to drink 'empty' units, purposeless drinking from boredom, keep the units for celebrations, for meet-ups, for dinners with friends, for sparkling chat.
More exercising. Planks - this year I managed less than a day's worth (22 hours), so more to do here. Press-ups are improving, as are weights - pull-ups are not so good. Left elbow gets sore if I overdo it on the exercise bar, so I did fewer (five a day averaged across the year) than in 2018 (seven a day). Overall - less 'lazy days' in which I couldn't find the motivation to exercise.
More fresh fruit and vegetables - just a small improvement, but moving in the right direction.
And blogging - second-highest output in terms of blog posts in since 2014, the year Twitter and Facebook caught up with and distracted me.
You may ask - what is the aim? I will answer: Pascal's Wager. In this case, I'm not betting on the existence of God (or otherwise), I'm betting that a healthy lifestyle will prolong years of active life. If I live to 100 in good form, you'll know why. My father set me a good goal - 96 and half years, 94 of which were 'active' (as in walking unaided, driving a car, mental acuity on form). If I sit back and do nothing, I will atrophy, my body will start winding down.
Ah yes - blood pressure. Today it was 116/80; last year it was 123/82. These are both average of three early-morning readings.
This time last year:
2019 - a year in numbers
This time two years ago:
2017 - a year in numbers
This time three years ago:
2016 - a year in numbers
This time four years ago:
2015 - a year in numbers
This time five years ago:
Economic forecasts for 2014 - and 2015?
This time six years ago:
Economic predictions for 2014
This time seven years ago:
Economic predictions for 2013
This time eight years ago:
Economic predictions for 2012
This time nine years ago:
Classic cars, West Ealing
This time ten years ago:
Jeziorki 2009, another view
This time 11 years ago:
Jeziorki 2008, another view
This time 12 years ago:
Final thoughts for 2007
Six years of daily measurement, augmented in the past three years by the Huawei Health App (according to which, I'm 'better' than 99.99% of users). "Beat yesterday" is Garmin's slogan. "Beat last year" is mine. Long-term rather than short-term metrics count.
So how did I do this year? Pretty good! What's the secret? The key is to never miss a day's 10,000 - with that as a basis, everything else builds up as a bonus. Compared to previous years, this year saw no great walkathons; several 20,000+ days, but nothing spectacular. Not in the table below - was 'moderate to high intensity' walking, of which every day this year I did an average of 24 minutes, according to Huawei Health. This metric was introduced to the app in November 2018. It's made me walk just that little bit faster.
| Measurable and manageable | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | |
| Paces/day (average over year) | 9.8k | 10.7k | 10.6k | 11.0k | 11.4k | 12.0k |
| Alcohol drunk (units/week) | 33.4 | 28.0 | 25.0 | 20.8 | 19.7 | 18.5 |
| Dry days over course of year | 94 | 123 | 155 | 186 | 196 | 198 |
| Days with zero physical training | 234 | 266 | 148 | 83 | 27 | 17 |
| Push-ups/day | N/A | N/A | N/A | 25 | 60 | 90 |
| Sets of weights exercises/day | N/A | N/A | N/A | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Portions fresh fruit'n'veg/day | N/A | 4.3 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.4 |
Bit of product placement here - pretty much every one of those 4.3 million paces I walked outdoors this year was in a pair of Loake shoes. No trainers, no wellies, no hiking boots - just four pairs of Loakes. Two pairs black, for office use, two pairs of ankle boots, for country walking.
Less alcohol consumed - still way off the NHS guidelines of 14 units a week, but a huge reduction from my late 50s, when in my first year of monitoring consumption, I averaged over 33 units a week. Key here is not to drink 'empty' units, purposeless drinking from boredom, keep the units for celebrations, for meet-ups, for dinners with friends, for sparkling chat.
More exercising. Planks - this year I managed less than a day's worth (22 hours), so more to do here. Press-ups are improving, as are weights - pull-ups are not so good. Left elbow gets sore if I overdo it on the exercise bar, so I did fewer (five a day averaged across the year) than in 2018 (seven a day). Overall - less 'lazy days' in which I couldn't find the motivation to exercise.
More fresh fruit and vegetables - just a small improvement, but moving in the right direction.
And blogging - second-highest output in terms of blog posts in since 2014, the year Twitter and Facebook caught up with and distracted me.
You may ask - what is the aim? I will answer: Pascal's Wager. In this case, I'm not betting on the existence of God (or otherwise), I'm betting that a healthy lifestyle will prolong years of active life. If I live to 100 in good form, you'll know why. My father set me a good goal - 96 and half years, 94 of which were 'active' (as in walking unaided, driving a car, mental acuity on form). If I sit back and do nothing, I will atrophy, my body will start winding down.
Ah yes - blood pressure. Today it was 116/80; last year it was 123/82. These are both average of three early-morning readings.
This time last year:
2019 - a year in numbers
This time two years ago:
2017 - a year in numbers
This time three years ago:
2016 - a year in numbers
This time four years ago:
2015 - a year in numbers
This time five years ago:
Economic forecasts for 2014 - and 2015?
This time six years ago:
Economic predictions for 2014
This time seven years ago:
Economic predictions for 2013
This time eight years ago:
Economic predictions for 2012
This time nine years ago:
Classic cars, West Ealing
This time ten years ago:
Jeziorki 2009, another view
This time 11 years ago:
Jeziorki 2008, another view
This time 12 years ago:
Final thoughts for 2007
Sunday, 29 December 2019
Last night in Ealing, Twenty-teens
By the end of the 1920s, the world was slumping into Depression; by the end of the 1930s, it was at war. Eighty years later, we lived through the global economic crisis - ten years on, there's no major European conflict, but things are generally nastier than they were in 2010. As I observed here, we reached a tipping point towards the end of 2012 - that great year of the London Olympics and the Euro 2012 football championships across Poland and Ukraine. Since then - Putin invades Ukraine, Kaczyński, Brexit, Trump. Not unrelated phenomena. Will things get better? Will things get worse?
A new decade beckons - this will be the eighth that has touched my life. Had my father made it a couple more months, he'd have been experiencing his 11th - only his memories of the 1920s are deeper than mine of the 1950s.
I look to the skies and hope - and hope. I live in hope. The sky is clear, the sun has just gone down. A short walk is in order. On another short walk earlier today, I had the insight that maybe Good - the quality of goodness - is a physical property - like mass and energy - a universal goal, a target, an ambition, something naturally striven towards. Three steps forward, two steps back but over the millennia, we're moving in the right direction, haltingly, unsure of ourselves, full of doubts - are we any the wiser? It would be smug to say "I think so"; it would be overly pessimistic to answer "no".
Cleveland Road; come May, it will be 50 years since we moved in. Before that, the Dysons owned the house for 37 years since it was built. Cleveland Rd looked much like it did in the 1930s, here and there the occasional new development (like the one on the corner of Highview Rd), but the spirit of place remains. Bombs fell on Cleveland Rd during the Blitz but spared the houses along this stretch.
Here is Castlebar Park station; I remember one foggy evening in early 1970; my parents were house-hunting and had narrowed the search down to Cleveland Road. My father took me for a walk to see it, half-an-hour from home on Croft Gardens. We did, I liked it. It had atmosphere, it had spirit of place, it was posh, it was 1930s, Art Deco. On the way home, we walked down to Castlebar Park Halt, as it was called at the time. No trees, no CCTV, just two dimly-lit platforms and a footbridge. In the far distance, to the north, lights in the fog, the diesely purr of a green railcar, running the shuttle service between Greenford and Ealing Broadway. We alighted two stops down the line at West Ealing and walked home from there. My mind was full of impressions; Edwardian England, country railway branch lines, clerestory coaches, oil-lit halts, milk churns - and 1930s England, posh houses, cocktail cabinets, zigzag patterns, eau-de-Nil wallpaper, starchy perfumes, proper oak flooring and staircases.
May the 2020s run smoothly, please - no wars, no disasters, no mass outbreaks of evil. A quiet, boring decade will do me fine.
"...Take me back to Ealing/When the evening ends."
A new decade beckons - this will be the eighth that has touched my life. Had my father made it a couple more months, he'd have been experiencing his 11th - only his memories of the 1920s are deeper than mine of the 1950s.
I look to the skies and hope - and hope. I live in hope. The sky is clear, the sun has just gone down. A short walk is in order. On another short walk earlier today, I had the insight that maybe Good - the quality of goodness - is a physical property - like mass and energy - a universal goal, a target, an ambition, something naturally striven towards. Three steps forward, two steps back but over the millennia, we're moving in the right direction, haltingly, unsure of ourselves, full of doubts - are we any the wiser? It would be smug to say "I think so"; it would be overly pessimistic to answer "no".
Cleveland Road; come May, it will be 50 years since we moved in. Before that, the Dysons owned the house for 37 years since it was built. Cleveland Rd looked much like it did in the 1930s, here and there the occasional new development (like the one on the corner of Highview Rd), but the spirit of place remains. Bombs fell on Cleveland Rd during the Blitz but spared the houses along this stretch.
Here is Castlebar Park station; I remember one foggy evening in early 1970; my parents were house-hunting and had narrowed the search down to Cleveland Road. My father took me for a walk to see it, half-an-hour from home on Croft Gardens. We did, I liked it. It had atmosphere, it had spirit of place, it was posh, it was 1930s, Art Deco. On the way home, we walked down to Castlebar Park Halt, as it was called at the time. No trees, no CCTV, just two dimly-lit platforms and a footbridge. In the far distance, to the north, lights in the fog, the diesely purr of a green railcar, running the shuttle service between Greenford and Ealing Broadway. We alighted two stops down the line at West Ealing and walked home from there. My mind was full of impressions; Edwardian England, country railway branch lines, clerestory coaches, oil-lit halts, milk churns - and 1930s England, posh houses, cocktail cabinets, zigzag patterns, eau-de-Nil wallpaper, starchy perfumes, proper oak flooring and staircases.
May the 2020s run smoothly, please - no wars, no disasters, no mass outbreaks of evil. A quiet, boring decade will do me fine.
"...Take me back to Ealing/When the evening ends."
- Ian Dury
This time last year:
The Day the World Didn't End
This time four years ago:
Hybrid driving - the verdict
This time six years ago:
Pitshanger Lane in the sun
This time 10 years ago:
Miserable, grey, wet London
This time 11 years ago:
Parrots in Ealing
This time 12 years ago:
Heathrow to Okęcie
This time last year:
The Day the World Didn't End
This time four years ago:
Hybrid driving - the verdict
This time six years ago:
Pitshanger Lane in the sun
This time 10 years ago:
Miserable, grey, wet London
This time 11 years ago:
Parrots in Ealing
This time 12 years ago:
Heathrow to Okęcie
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