Monday, 25 April 2022

Russia's army: not what we feared it was

Within days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, observers could see that the invading army had many shortcomings. From the strategic (it was prepared for a three-day war, regime change, and being welcomed as liberators) and the doctrinal (the way, for example, tanks or infantry are used), to the operational (truck tyres, expired ration packs, poor wireless communication with the front line) it's clear that Russia's military leadership has (thankfully) failed to its reputation.

The world has moved on in many ways from WW2, when the Red Army seized Berlin. Some of the factors - and differences - were overlooked by Western analysts. Key is manpower. The generation of young men who fought WW2 was born at a time when the average Russian woman had a fertility rate of 7.3. The young men Putin is sending into Ukraine were born around 2000, by which time the average Russian woman was giving birth to a mere 1.23 children. In other words, Stalin had meat for the meatgrinder, Putin doesn't. (Having said that, neither does Ukraine. But the Ukrainian army isn't wasting its manpower like Russia's is.)

We could see outside Kyiv, the famous 40-km-long column, stalled for lack of fuel, less than 100km from the border. Logistics are crucial to victory. Without the 400,000 vehicles that America supplied to the USSR as part of Lend-Lease, the Red Army would not have been able to advance west at such speed in 1943-45. Of that number, 200,000 alone were Studebaker 6×6 trucks, the rest being smaller 4x4 trucks, Jeeps and Dodge Weapons Carriers. Below: a Studebaker US6 2½-ton 6×6 truck... 

...and the most-widely produced Soviet trucks of the Second World War era, the ZIS 5 and GAZ AA (left and right respectively below), outdated, less robust, and built in smaller numbers than those received from America. 


Russian logistics in Ukraine are the result of poor planning, poor training, poor maintenance, poor equipment and widespread corruption. Tanks stuck in the middle of nowhere without fuel, soldiers without rations because the campaign was to be over in three days. Many ammunition supply trucks were destroyed by Ukrainian fire because unloading shells is done crate by crate by soldiers, rather than removed from the truck by the pallet-load using a crane. Manual labour is cheaper, but it takes much longer - giving artillery-spotting drones a chance to locate and destroy their target - thousands of shells.

Russia's infantry-fighting doctrine hasn't moved on from the day of the mass charge against prepared positions. Note the long, curved magazine on the AK47/74 family of assault rifles. It cannot be fired by a soldier lying down - it's meant to be fired by a soldier advancing. But most importantly - the basic infantry unit, the squad, is without autonomy. The squad leader is not allowed to take the initiative - only to follow orders. The rigid top-down command-and-control system has been under strain due to poor quality communications equipment - senior officers have to move right up to the front line to get reluctant troops to advance - and get hit by Ukrainian artillery or snipers. Russia has lost ten generals in two months.

NATO doctrine has always focused on the autonomy of the squad. Like in any democracy, war-fighting should be done on the basis of teamwork and consensus, and not taking (bad) orders from the top.  Ukraine's armed forces - fighting for their country these past eight years - have accepted the NATO way of doing things. This leads to greater cohesion, morale and combat effectiveness. And reflects a healthier society - a network, rather than a hierarchy.

Another major factor hampering unit cohesion in the Russian army is continued presence of dedovshchina - the systematic hazing of recruits and conscripts by their elders. From Wikipedia: "Dedovshchina encompasses a variety of subordinating and humiliating activities undertaken by the junior ranks, from doing the chores of the senior ranks, to violent and sometimes deadly physical and psychological abuse, not unlike an extremely vicious form of bullying or torture, including sexual torture and anal rape. When not leaving the army seriously injured, conscripts can suffer serious mental trauma for their lifetime. It is often cited by former military personnel as a major source of poor morale." 

So - brutal stupidity, and stupid, counterproductive brutality. In close combat, the hazed can take revenge on their tormentors. Who knows where that bullet was fired from. An army formed of soldiers traumatised to the point of insensitivity is easier to order to be brutal to civilians or prisoners of war, which has negative consequences in the memetic war - the global struggle for hearts and minds. Which Russia is losing and Ukraine is winning, with its tractors and cats.

Putin drew back the forces that had been trying to capture Kyiv and reassigned them to the east of Ukraine, without much pause, with the bare minimum of new equipment - but without any of the root-and-branch reforms needed to create an effective fighting force. 'More of the same' is all Putin can muster. Reform of military doctrine means social reform - bullying and corruption are the very basis of Putin's Russia, dressed up in a nationalist ideology that has all the hallmarks of fascism.

The top-down corruption endemic in the Russian army has also played a major part - monies earmarked for research and development, for the modernisation of tanks and aircraft, were spent on villas and yachts. What was spent created a Potemkin army of T-14 Armata tanks and Sukhoi Su-57 'fifth-generation' stealth jet fighters that are only seen on parades. There were meant to have been 2,300 Armatas in service by 2020. Instead, there are now planned to be only 100 by this year; the first regiment of Su-57s is planned to become operational by 2025. [At least the money Germany didn't spend as planned on defence was diverted to social programmes.]

Russia's army, as they say, is "big and modern - just that the 'big' part isn't modern and the 'modern' part isn't big." Nevertheless, Putin has the ability to use nuclear blackmail - and this is a worry - even if only one in six of his missiles works properly.

This time last year:
Long wait for apple blossom

This time three years ago:


This time nine years ago:
Kestrel on the roof

This time ten years ago:
Definitely worse in Britain

This time 11 years ago:
Miracle on the Vistula

This time 12 years ago:

This time 13 years ago:|
A new dimension to plane-spotting

This time 14 years ago:
One swallow does not a summer make

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